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ABSTRACT Food crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa has been explained in terms of
demographic pressure. natural calamities, deterioration of trade. external debt burden, etc.
However, the analysis of Zairean case these last years shows that the agrarian crisis has been
generated and reinforced by an inadequate economic policy which emphasizes the mining
sector to the prejudice of the peasant agriculture.
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INTRODUCTION: FACTORS EXPLAINING AGRARIAN CRISIS IN
AFRICA
Many African countries are hit by an unprecedented agrarian CriSIS. During
these years, about 20 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have been confronted wilh
the starvation or famine problems, while the malnutrition, in particular among
children. is almost a generalized phenomenon. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only
region in the world where per capita food production has declined by 1.3%
(Gakou, 1987) over the past twenty years. Table I provides interesting data about
the per capita food production in Sub-Saharan countries.
The countries in Group A have an average index of per capita food production
(106) higher than the index of the basic year (1969-1971 = 100). However, they
have recorded high annual demographic gro\\lh rates (3.9%). Among the coun-
tries of Group B, the average demographic growth rate is 2.4% per year. while the
average index of per capita food production (90) has decreased compared to the
basic period. Zaire belongs to this group with an index per capita food production
of 92 and demographic rate of 2.8% per year. In Zairean case, foodstuffs, except
cassava. have not recorded any progression, but on the contrary. a diminution of
total production in absolute terms. The situation is the worst in countries of Group
C with a demographic growth rate of 2.9% per year and a food production index
below 80 compared to the basic period.
l'vlany studies have emphasized the population growth for the explanation of this
food crisis and have privileged the family planning policies as a means to overcome
the situation (see Jansen, 1987). However, demographic pressure cannot be con-
sidered as the main factor of the agrarian crisis because Africa has 25% of the
world's potential arable land. while its population represents only 10% of the
world population. Also the situation in Group A countries denies the Malthusian
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correlation between demographic growth and food supplies in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Different factors have been pointed out to explain this food or agrarian crisis in
Africa. Commins (1986:6) has ranged the academic and professional literature on
this topic in externalist-internalist categories: "Broadly speaking, externalists are in-
clined to place primary emphasis on causal factors outside Africa and. therefore.
beyond the jurisdiction of its political systems, while internalists place greater em-
phasis on the policy of African governments."
Derriennic's analysis of the famine in Sahel has demonstrated that from 1965 to
1974 the global food output exceeded the domestic consumption in this region, but
the peasant community could not stock the surplus in anticipation of poor harvests
and climatic perturbations which have been a normal situation in the Sahel in the
past. Famine occurs because of a set of dominations and extractions (taxes, govern-
mental marketing boards, low agricultural prices, etc.) which lock the peasant com-
munity in a vicious circle of dependency and poverty (Derriennic, 1977). Other fac-
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tors such as the decline of trade for primary products in the world market, the
burden of external debt, natural calamities (drought), environmental degradation
(deforestation), civil wars, etc. have been widely commented by different authors
(Borton & Clay, 1988).
In this paper, I intend to understand the agrarian crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa
through the case study of Zaire. In fact the actual situation of Zairean agriculture
is very similar to other mining countries where agriculture has been weakened for
the benefit of the mining production. In these countries, economic crisis is mainly
an agricultural crisis. Zaire is now running into debt (about 7 billion dollars). par-
tially for food imports which now cover more than 40% of the national food re-
quirements (against only 1% before 1960).
Further. Zairean agriculture contributed to 50% of the GDP before in-
dependence. Today, it accounts for less than 15%. This decrease is also observed
about export earnings and labor. This situation explains the steady dependence of
Zairean economy on copper exports. It also explains the paradox of a country
potentially very rich but whose people are among the poorest in Africa with a per
capita income estimated at 260 dollars per year.
I will analyze the economic policy followed in Zaire and its impact on the current
agrarian crisis. 1 am particularly concerned with the allocation of public resources
to different economic sectors. the objectives pursued by policy makers and the
economic achievements. By placing agriculture in a general context of the
economic policy, I can explain the current situation of this sector, its problems and
perspectives.
Tinbergen (1967:6) wrote. "the economic policy consists of the deliberate
manipulation of a number of means in order to attain certain aims. n In this paper
the economic policy is viewed as a set of measures to attain objectives of develop-
ment preliminarily defined. In this sense, an adequate analysis of the economic
policy of a given country should comport the following three components:(1) the
objectives pursued by policy makers; (2) the means devoted to attain these objec-
tives; and (3) the comparison of targets and achievements.
Political stability is an important environmental prerequisite to the economic
development in developing countries, such as Zaire, where the economic policy
and its realization rely almost exclusively on the initiative and leadership of the
state. Zaire achieved its political stability in 1966-1967. Since then there would
have been sufficient time to define and undertake a rational economic policy in
order to evade underdevelopment and material poverty. The following analysis of
Zairean economic policy is based on the way resources are allocated to different sec-
tors and on economic results achieved. Official declarations and development plans
should be considered as aspiration or explicit objectives to attain. This analysis is
conform to the recommendations of Rudloff (1968) who suggested that the correct
comprehension of a given economic policy requires adequate answers to the follow-
ing three questions: (1) who decides about the economic policy; (2) what are the ob-
jectives of the economic policy; and (3) means available to attain thcse objectives.
With regard to developing countries, we should also ask who is to benefit from
achievements of the economic policy. The reason is that "in the present developing
countries, a tremendous gap exists between the policy-makers' world of economy
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and the people's world of economy. Calculations which are rational to the
economic planners are not necessarily rational to the people whose participation is
crucial for the achievement of the plans" (lnukai, 1979:6). This study hypothesizes
that the wrong economic policy to expand the mining sector, to invest inap-
propriately in the manufacturing industry and to ignore completely the peasant
agriculture in the allocation of available resources, constitutes the right explana-
tion for the current agrarian crisis in Zaire. This economic policy has mainly
benefited the politico-commercial bourgeoisie rather than common people, in par-
ticular those in the peasant agriculture -i.e. the small-scale farming relying on sim-
ple manual tools and making a living from farm work.
l'",lacgaffy (1987) classified Zairean politico-commercial bourgeoisie into three
strata. The first stratum comprises the few persons at the head of the most impor-
tant economic enterprises or in control of the political and military organization,
while the second is composed of persons occupying almost all important ad-
ministrative, political and economic positions. The third category is the aspirant
bourgeoisie including thousands of middle-level officials and administrators,
university graduates and professors.
Some researchers prefer the term "political aristocracy" to national bourgeoisie
to refer to the dominant class in Africa. Callaghy (1984) considers that the ruling
class is not a bourgeoisie in any true sense because it is not a productive social
class. It is a political aristocracy because its basic values, its power and its
economic base result from its relationship to the state. However. the middle class
has an important role in the process of economic development. This class is still in
formation in Zaire and when I refer to the politico-commercial bourgeoisie in this
paper, I do not include these entrepreneurs whose dynamism can be clearly observ-
ed in Macgaffy's study (1987) of distinguishing entrepreneurs and parasites in
Kisangani.
First, I analyze Zairean economic policy from a historic point of view consider-
ing economic objectives, the strategy utilized to attain each of them and the results
in each sector. I will then clarify the mechanisms connecting this economic policy
v·lith the current agrarian crisis.
ZAIREAN ECONOMIC POLICY FROM A HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW
I. The Colonial Period and Early Independence Years
Before the partition of Africa during the nineteenth century, the geographic
space occupied by Zaire today had a wide variety of political organizations. Accor-
ding to Futter (1983:28) "some groups. such as the Luba. have a tradition of
statehood going back a thousand years." Strong and politically well organized
kingdoms, such as Lunda, Kuba, and Chiokwe, had achieved important realiza-
tions in commerce, agriculture and craft industry. During the European penetra-
tion from the fifteenth century to the colonization in 1880, the slave trade reduced
local dynamism and caused a severe technological arrest. Rodney (1974) justly
argued that European powers have underdeveloped Africa through the slave trade.
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From 1880 to 1908, Zaire. known as the Congo Free State, was a personal pro-
perty of King Leopold II of Belgium. This period has been characterized by the
pillage of the country's resources and the transfer of commodities (rubber, ivory.
etc.) to Belgium without any counterpart. The cruelty of European officials during
this period raised international disapprobation which led to direct colonization by
Belgium.
During the direct colonization by Belgium (1908-1960), Zaire was assigned a
precise role of producing minerals and agricultural raw materials and of buying
manufactured goods from the metropolis. The result of this policy was the forma-
tion of peripheral economy, essentially extrovert and dependent. These economic
structures created according to the colonial division of labor still characterize
Zairean economy. Dependence on raw material exports, implementation of
import-substitution industries and agrarian crisis constitute a colonial legacy in
Zaire.
Zairean independence in 1960 came with political troubles and disorders. In this
chaotic economic context characterized by high inflation rates and disorganization
of the state's finances, different economic sectors recorded divergent evolution.
Agricultural production collapsed and the commercial agricultural output
represented only 64% of 1959 level by 1965. Also problems linked to import
capacities favored the national industry but high inflation prevented the import of
equipment and raw materials because of the lack of foreign currency. The mining
sector generally recorded an important increase despite an important foreign ex-
change loss through diamond smuggling. For instance in 1964, it was calculated
that as much as 81 % of Zairean official production was fraudulently exported
(Macgaffy, 1987). Zaire achieved its political stability in 1965-1966. With the
stabilization of economy and political condition, the IVlobutu Regime (Second
Republic) could define economic objectives in order to attain the national develop-
ment.
II. Economic Policy during the 1966-1990 Period
The main objectives of development defined by Zairean state since 1966 have
been economic independence. expansion of the mining sector, strengthening of the
import-substitution industries and development of agriculture. Below I will con-
sider the meaning of each objective, means used to achieve them and evaluation of
the results.
I. Economic Independence
(I) Meaning of this objective
Colonization molded Third World countries. in particular the Sub-Saharan
Africa, in dependent economies in several ways. This dependency was, above all,
commercial in the sense that colonies had to import from and export to European
metropolises. It also reverted a financial aspect that both public and private foreign
investments were provided by the same metropolises. Further, colonies had to rely
on colonizers for technicians and qualified manpower. As Esseks (1975) noted, just
before African countries became independent, economic choices about what to pro-
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duce, where to invest, what must be considered as priority concerning imports, ex-
ports, prices, educational system, employment, etc. were dictated by foreigners.
We can better understand efforts of some African countries to break the
dependence in this context which is a colonial legacy. In many African countries
the political independence is meaningless without economic emancipation from
former colonizer. Schumacher (1974: 171) argued that the economic sovereignty is
the most important component of the economic development: The roots of the
economic development "lie ... in a national consciousness of self-reliance."
A country is considered economically independent when it freely decides about
its economic partners, about the utilization of its natural resources and about the
appropriate economic policy to follow according to national interests. Zaire
presents all characteristics of a dependent economy: Dependence on few export
items, in particular on the copper; dependence on UEBL (Union Economique
Belgo-Luxembourgeoise) and on some countries of the European Community.
Zaire is also financially dependent because foreign capital and investments are
almost exclusively from Belgium, France and the United States.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the dependence of Zairean economy through its foreign
trade. African countries can overcome this dependence by intensifying regional
trade through existing economic unions such as CPGL (Communaute Economique
des Pays de Grands Lacs), UDEAC (Union Douaniere de I'Afrique Centrale), etc.
and by diversifying commercial partners with a special emphasis on developing
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Fig. 1. Destination of Zairean exports (1978-1984).
(Source: Banquc du Zaire, 1985: 199)
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Fij(.2. Provenance of Zairean imports (1978-1984).
(Source: Banql1c du Za'ire, 1985: 2(0)
Table 2. Repartition of impons (Thousands of SDR).
1978 1980 1982 1984 1985 1987
Food 93,630 64,303 38,110 51,954 23,666 103,872
Consumer goods 45,169 61,931 23,511 37,186 36,288 88,483
Raw materials 94,147 95,156 81,928 119,769 100,141 136,948
Equipment goods 76,430 80,680 66,084 111,103 78,258 136,919
Energy 83,565 157,042 56,662 72,687 82,454 28,853
Others 149,083 179,634 168,759 275,454 458,774 275,704
Total 542,084 638,746 435,054 668,153 779,581 860,857
Relative pan of 17.28 10.06 8.75 10.59 3.00 12.06food imports in %
Source: Banquc du ZaIre, 1985: 218, 1989: 206.
countries.
Table 2 shows the composition of Zairean imports from 1978 to 1987. Food im-
ports represented 17.28% of the total imports in 1978, 10.06% in 1980,7.77% in
1984 and 12.06% in 1987. The origin of food imports is not specified in official
reports; however, it seems that the European Communi1y and the United States are
the most important providers according to the general trend of Zairean foreign
trade.
To overcome economic dependence, the Zairean state tried to reinforce its con-
trol over the country's resources. However, the weakness of the First Republic
(1960-1965) did not enable the state to negotiate efficiently on crucial matters such
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as the colonial debt, the status of chartered companies and other corporations in
which the colonial state held shares. The Second Republic achieved political unity
and engaged in a struggle for economic independence in 1966-1967. To achieve
this objective, the state has undertaken some actions. the most important of which
are the nationalization of the mining sector and the Zaireanization and radicaliza-
tion measures.
(2) Means to achieve economic independence
(a) Nationalization of the mining sector
Until 1966, Zairean mining production, in particular the copper production, was
controlled by UMHK (Union Miniere du Haut Katanga), a Belgian private enter-
prise. The Zairean state decided the transfer to Zaire of all public enterprises which
had been managed by Belgium. The powerful U~lHK rejected this decision and the
Zairean state reacted by disbanding UMHK in Zaire. The Shaba mining exploita-
tion was nationalized by creating Gecamines (Generale des carrieres et des mines),
entirely owned by the state.
The nationalization of UMHK had a strong impact on Zairean economy con-
sidering the strategic importance of the Shaba minerals. For instance. by 1965
Ul\lHK produced 300,000 metric tons of copper (6.2% of the world production),
10,000 tons of cobalt (60% of the world production), 174,000 tons of zinc concen-
trates, and precious metals such as cadmium, germanium, gold, silver, etc. Until
1960, UMHK was a major producer of uranium. The first nuclear weapons were
made from the ore supplied by this firm.
UMHK also controlled an important array of subsidiaries in Zaire and in
Belgium. e.g. coal mines, hydroelectric infrastructures, plants producing sulfuric
acid, explosives and caustic soda, flour mills, etc. UMHK provided 50% of the
state revenues and 70% of foreign exchange. UMHK vast financial empire was just-
ly considered as a state within a state which owned its cities, medical centers and
hospitals. educational system, police, supply centers. etc. Thus, one can unders-
tand why the nationalization of this enterprise was pivotal to the concept of
economic independence in Zaire.
(b) Zaireanization and radicalization
Zaireanization, also called November 30th measures, was decided in 1973. Its
objective appeared to be breathtaking bid for economic independence. It affected
foreign (mainly Greek, Portuguese and Pakistani) assets in commerce, plantation
sector, small ind ustries and property holding enterprises.
Zaireanization can be considered as part of a broader African trend toward
displacing foreigners from commerce. In this, Zaire followed other African states
such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Nigeria. Uganda, etc. which took the same
decisions between 1968 and 1973. These measures attempted to assure the primacy
of nationals in commerce and small industries.
In December 1974. the ruling political class decided to further the expropriation
of foreign assets by nationalizing big units which were not subjected to Zaireaniza-
tion measures. This second phase of the nationalization measures, known as
"radicalization", concerned about 120 enterprises in the following sectors:
Transport, mines, petroleum, ranches, hotels, banks, construction and quarrying,
metallurgy and breweries. These enterprises were put under the state's control. The
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most hit of these measures were Belgians.
(3) Achievements
Below I will compare achievements with targets previously determined in order
to understand success or failure of Zairean economic policy with regard to its
economic independence.
Though Gecamines became a 100% state corporation, the mining sector is still
controlled by expatriates through supply and maintenance of technology. Zairean
cadres are available mostly in administrative, accounting and medical services. Fur-
ther, foreign capital firmly controls the marketing and prices of the copper in the
world market. Also. a substantial part of Zairean copper production is still refined
at Hoboken refineries in Belgium. Thus it is clear that the nationalization of
UMHK did not provide the full control of the mining sector to the state because
crucial decisions concerning prices. volume of production, commercial partners,
etc. still escape Zairean control.
Zaireanization and radicalization were truly revolutionary decisions with regard
to their goal of amputating foreign domination over the national economy.
However, they were at once denatured by mismanagement and incompetence of
persons who benefited from them. The beneficiaries, also called "acquereurs,"
were top political cadres, administrators and influential businessmen. Economic
results of these measures proved to be a social and economic disaster: The produc-
tion decreased sharply in diverse sectors; many cases of shortages, layoffs, pay ar-
rearage, tax evasion, abandonment of business, etc. w"ere recorded and "acq-
uereur" denomination became a pejorative category in the social consciousness.
In late 1975, the Zairean state was virtually in bankrupt and had to appeal to
Western powers and international institutions for salvation. The sine qua non con-
dition imposed by the creditors was the retrocession of nationalized assets to the
former foreign owners. Zaireanization and radicalization have produced effects ex-
actly opposite to the target of economic sovereignty. The dependence of Zaire has
been strengthened and today the state has almost nothing to say about economic
choices which are dictated by the IMF and other external lenders.
2. Expansion of the Mining Sector
The second objective pursued by the Zairean state during the period 1966-1990
concerns expansion of the mining production. I will discuss the meaning of this ob-
jective, the strategy intended to achieve it, and evaluation of results of this policy.
(I) Meaning of this objective
Most developing countries export minerals and cash crops which generally con-
stitute more than 90% of their total export returns. These countries receive their
foreign exchange from the mining and plantation sectors. Zaire possesses impor-
tant quantities of minerals. It is the first producer of diamond and cobalt in the
\vorld, the sixth producer of copper, also a producer of zinc. oil, manganese, etc.
Today, the mining sector provides 80% of Zairean export earnings. Taxes paid on-
ly by Gecamines contribute for an average of 50% to the state's annual budget.
Table 3 shows the evolution of Zairean exports and the place occupied by different
economic sectors. These data reveal that in 1950 the mining sector furnished about
the same amount of foreign currency as agriculture. After 1960, however. there has
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Table 3. The cOlllribution of dilTerent economic sectors in Zairean export returns from 1950 to 1987
(in ~b).
1950 1956 1970 1975 1980 1984 1987
Mining exports 49.82 65.86 83.39 81.72 84.72 67.71 76.47
Copper 23.90 40.27 65.95 55.43 43.76 29.05 60.02
Cobalt 5.41 7.16 5.97 10.60 20.30 11.06
Diamond 3.71 4.95 5.09 7.00 4.25 9.79 11.38
Agricultural Exports 48.87 33.02 15.95 15.65 11.86 13.66 11.40
Coffee 9.23 8.19 5.57 6.19 8.04 10.27 7.94
Caoutchouc 1.39 3.81 1.83 1.33 0.74 0.87 0.54
Oil palm products 15.88 8.67 4.60 4.68 1.03 0.54 0.09
Industrial exports 1.31 1.21 0.66 1.37 3.42 18.63 12.11
Others 1.26 0.02
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Banque Centrale du Congo Beige et du Rwanda-Urundi, 1960: 84-87; Banque du Zaire, 1986:
217, 1989: 205.
been a reversing tendency and the mining sector is now the principal source of
Zairean foreign exchange.
Indeed. it has been argued in Zaire that expansion of the mining production is
the only way to earn more foreign currency which will be used to import equip-
ment, to industrialize the country and to modernize agriculture. From the late
1960's to thc present, the economic policy of the state has been centered on expan-
ding the mining production.
(2) Means of implementation
An important investment program was implemented to provide an adequate in-
frastructure to the mining production and to create new enterprises devoted to cop-
per exploitation. At first, projects such as the Inga dam and the Inga-Shaba power
transmission line were undertaken to supply the mining Province of Shaba with ad-
ditional electric power for expanding copper production and allowing Gecamines
to realize its development program. The Inga dam project costed 140 million
dollars in phase-I, and produced 300 megawatts in 1972. Inga II (700 megawatts)
was made available in 1977. Inga-Shaba electric power is considered the cheapest
in the world. This power line, which transmits electricity from Inga dam to the
Shaba mining region (l ,800 km). cost 1 billion dollars (about 1/5 of the total exter-
nal debt of Zaire in the early 1980s).
Beside these projects, other undertakings aimed to increase copper output. For
example, I may mention the creation of SMTF (Societe Miniere de Tenke
Fungurumu) consortium. The initial capital belonged to the Zairean state (20%)
and to private partners, mainly American, French and Japanese (80%). The target
of this firm was to produce 100,000 tons of copper per year. Its cost was estimated
at 400-500 million dollars in 1976: but it increased at 1.2 billion dollars in 1979
(Young & Turner, 1985). Further, the "Societe de Development Industriel et des
I\'lines du Zaire" (Sodimiza) began an annual production of 50,000 tons of copper
in 1972. Sodimiza was found by the Nippon tvlining Company (85%). Zaire held
only 15% of equities. The cost of this investment was estimated at 90 million
dollars.
Gecamines also undertook an expansion program. A two-stage development
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plan was initiated to raise copper production capacity from 360,000 to 460,000
tons (first stage: 1970-1975) and from 460,000 to 570,000 tons (second stage:
1975-1979). The cobalt production capacity was to be raised from 16,000 tons in
1975 to 18,000 tons in 1979, and that of zinc from 130,000 tons in 1975 to 150,000
tons in 1979. All these investments were financed with foreign loans.
(3) Achievements
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Fig. 3. The copper price movement.
(Source: A-Young & Turner, 1985: 308; B-Gamela et aI., 1987: 67)
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200 million dollars, suspended operation in 1976. In 1983, the Japanese consor-
tium also abandoned operation of its Zairean mines. Gecamines was unable to com-
plete the second stage of its expansion program. All these enterprises were hit by
the prolonged slump of the copper market since 1975.
These investments in the mining sector, totaling more than 3 billion dollars of
foreign loans, greatly escalated the dependence of Zairean economy on the copper.
Also, most of the projects financed with foreign loans were an opportunity for per-
sonal wealth accumulation. Verhaegen (1978) rightly categorized such projects as
technological imperialism, which shed light on the import of inappropriate, useless
and costly technology, which was fragile and not adapted to the real needs of
development and to the conditions of society. It happened, Verhaegen argued, by
the coincidence of interests between the supplier of technology and the hegemonic
class within Zaire.
The copper production cannot constitute an engine of development because of
the instability of the mineral prices in the international market. Figure 3 shO\vs the
copper price fluctuation from 1950 to 1977 (Young & Turner, 1985) and from 1978
to 1984 (Gamela et aI., 1987). This instability cannot allow a correct and com-
prehensive development planning based on the copper revenues. However, in the
five year plan (1986-1990), the zairean government (Departement du Plan, 1986:78)
decided [Q finance the mining sector with 33.823 million zaires (against 19,886
million for agriculture). It proves that Zairean policy makers still give priority to
the expansion of the mining sector, despite the evidence that mineral export earn-
ings are unstable and lack enough dynamism to induce national development in a
self-reliance perspective.
3. Import-Substitution Industry
The third objective consists of implanting and extending the import-substitution
industry in Zaire.
(I) i'vleaning of this objective
Industrialization has been considered an engine of development in many Third
World countries. There is a strong correlation between industrialization and
economic development. This positive correlation can be verified by the economic
history of Western developed countries since their industrial revolution. Many
scientists and political leaders have strongly recommended developing countries to
build their own industry so as to overcome underdevelopment.
Import-substitution, which consists of creating local industries for producing
goods previously imported, is advocated as an adequate way to achieve in-
dustrialization in developing countries. This kind of industry has been thought to
be able to provide an industrial base to a country by producing commodities which
already have a market. This industry enables a country to save its foreign currency
which can be used to expand other sectors. in particular agriculture.
Zairean manufacturing industry consists of multiple firms producing consump-
tion goods such as soft drinks, beer, food, chemicals, building materials, cement,
wire, textiles, tobacco, intermediate goods, etc. This industry was established from
the 1920s and received a great stimulus during the colonial period. During the last
twenty years of the colonial rule. manufacturing was the fastest growing sector
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reaching 8% of the GOP by 1958. The Second Republic also gave a high priority
to this sector and by the early 1970s manufacturing was about 11% of the GOP.
(2) Means of implementation
From the colonial period to the present, Zairean attempts of industrialization fill
in the import-substitution category. A new wave of manufacturing investments
was carried out in the 1969-1976 period. Vehicles assembly plants were established
by General Motors, Leyland and Renault. Goodyear also established a tire factory
and Continental Grains opened a flour mill in the city port of Matadi.
German Krupp contributed to the implantation of a 13-rnillion-dollars oil palm
and soap enterprise in Gemena (Province de l'Equateur), while another German
firm built a new cement facility with a capacity of 350,000 tons per year. In the
same way, a steel mill was constructed at Maluku (Kinshasa). Its capacity was
estimated at 250,000 tons per year: it was expected to exploit national iron deposits
(Banalia, Isiro, Ubundu and Luebo). The cost of this investment was estimated at
250 million dollars. It was entirely financed by the state with technical assistance
from Italy and Germany. Other new enterprises were built in established fields, in
particular textiles (Sotexki: Societe Textile de Kisangani) and tobacco (BAT:
British American Tobacco).
(3) Achievements
Some Zairean economists (Kankwenda, 1978; Mawa. 1978) have emphasized the
weakness of the import-substitution enterprises to satisfy national requirements
and their deep dependence on foreign technologies and capital. The dependence of
these industries is at first commercial because 50% of the raw materials they use are
imported. Thus. they experience severe production difficulties when the payment
crisis hit the country. This dependence is also technological because equipment.
knowledge and technicians operating in this sector belong to private and public
foreign institutions. Import-substitution industries operate at high costs (import of
raw materials and technology) and their products are relatively expensive com-
pared to imports. Young & Turner (1985) showed that tires produced in Zaire by
Goodyear were 40% more expensive; textiles, 20-40 %; etc. than imported ones.
4. Agricultural Development Policy
(1) Meaning of this objective
Since 1968, agriculture has been qualified in the state's declaration as "priority
of priorities." The government has defined some objectives and undertaken diverse
actions to achieve them. Agricultural objectives were to cope with the chronic crisis
with regard to the national self-sufficiency in food production, to attain regular
supply of national industries with local raw materials, to maximize export earnings
from agriculture, and to improve living conditions in rural areas.
(2) Means of implementation
About national food self-sufficiency, the Ministry of Agriculture has defined a
program aimed to improve the formation of its technicians and extension workers.
Also some offices were created (programme National Mals, Programme National
Manioc, Programme National Riz. etc.) to palliate the inefficiency of agricultural
research led by INERA (lnstitut National d'Etude et Recherche Agronomique). In
the same way, the Zairean state adopted World Bank's recommendations of "in-
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tegrated agricultural development" to introduce technological package of fer-
tilizers. improved seeds and equipment among small-scale farmers. The govern-
ment also relied on Protestant and Catholic missionaries to introduce appropriate
technology, animal-drawn cultivation and cooperatives in rural areas.
With regard to cash crops and large-scale farming, the government decided to in-
crease financing facilities by creating an agricultural credit bank called BCA (Ban-
que de Credit Agricole), and by improving financial resources of existent institu-
tions such as SOFIDE (Societe Financiere de Developpement). It was also decided
to allow the repatriation of profit made by foreign investors who had already
benefited from important fiscal exonerations.
For the peasants' welfare in rural settlements. it was decided to liberalize
agricultural prices in order to increase the producers' purchasing power. It was
thought that the market prices would be in favour of small-scale farmers and
would ultimately increase the commercial production.
(3) Achievements
Results recorded by the state in the agricultural sector were far below expecta-
tions. About food self-sufficiency, achievements show that this objective has not
been reached because Zaire still relies on important food imports. Before 1960
Zaire reached self-sufficiency, while today the country imports about 40% of its
food consumption. Despite food imports, the national requirements are not fulfill-
ed. In particular the situation is worst for meat and fish with respectively 4.18 kg
and 4 kg per year as an average consumption, while the FAO norms are 25 kg for
meat and 21 kg for fish (DADR. 1987).
With regard to agricultural raw materials for supply of national indusrries,
achievements are also far below expectations. For instance, the national textile in-
dustries need 60,000 tons of cotton per year. but the peasant production is only
21,000 tons. The situation is similar for other agricultural raw materials such as
palm oil, rubber, sugar cane, etc. Contrary to the aimed maximization of export
earnings from agriculture, the actual situation shows that agricultural part still con-
tinues to decrease. While the average contribution of this sector was around 40%
before 1960, today it fluctuates between 20.2% (1976) and 9% (1982). In govern-
mental policy, the mining takes priority over agriculture and generates about 80%
of total export returns. Therefore investments are almost exclusively orientated
towards the mining industry. Lastly, impoverishment of rural areas proves to be
contrary to the governmental objective of improving the standard of living in rural
areas. Indeed, the gap between prices paid to producers and prices of manufac-
tured goods cannot allow peasants to improve their purchasing power and to evade
material poverty.
ECONOMIC POLICY AND AGRARIAN CRISIS
Below, 1 will show how the current agrarian crisis in Zaire is a direct conse-
quence of the wrong economic policy, which neglects agriculture to the benefit of
mining sector ane! furthers underdevelopment and material poverty. Zaire has
abundant arable land. Today only 5% of this arable land is estimated under cultiva-
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tion. The current levels of output are far below the productive capacity. Before
1960, Zaire achieved food self-sufficiency and agriculture contributed an average
of 40 %to the export earnings. This sector also recorded an average annual growth
rate of 5.4%. Today, Zaire is relying on food imports and the commercial balance
for agricultural commodities has often been negative. How can we explain this
tendency in spite of official declarations explicitly recognizing agriculture as "the
priority of priorities "? I consider the current agrarian crisis in Zaire as a normal
consequence of the state's economic policy.
At first, the vast investment program aimed at expanding mining production has
raised the external debt from almost zero in 1970 to more than 7 billion dollars to-
day. Clearly, after the execution of this program, nothing was left to finance
agriculture. Before 1960, about 5% of the budget went to agriculture, while today
only 1-2% is devoted to this sector. It should be also noted that about 90% of
these expenditures were salaries of the agricultural administration whose services
to peasants were actually questionable. Also before 1960 agriculture accounted for
more than 15% of total investment. while today the figure is generally around
3.5%. Neither the state nor private investors found agricultural investments attrac-
tive.
Only the infrastructure devoted to export minerals has been improved or main-
tained in good shapes. The maintenance of a rural road network has been complete-
ly neglected. Tlus situation explains the paradoxical fact that "from 1974 to 1977,
when as much as one-third of desperately short foreign exchange was spent to im-
pon food for cities, large amount of maize rotted in the countryside" (Young &
Turner, 1985:321-322). Further, the agricultural research network created by the


















Fig. 4. Reciprocity and extraction relationship between different interest groups in Zairean economy.
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replaced scientific research in the stations of INERA.
Beside the state's inability to deliver positive agricultural services, the
agricultural policy, in particular in the pricing system, has clearly demonstrated
negative impact on agricultural production. In fact agricultural prices. as during
the colonial period, have been maintained at low levels in rural areas, while the
prices of manufactured goods remain very high. The state's policy of according
monopolies of buying to some private or public institutions resulted in the transfer
of net revenues from peasants to traders and exporters of cash crops.
The agrarian crisis in Zaire is not an accidental situation but results from the
economic policy as it has been defined and achieved up to the present. The current
economic crisis should not be considered as a cyclic crisis which characterizes
capitalist economies, but as a structural phenomenon explained by the economic
policy followed in the country. Figure 4 and Table 4 explain the way in which the
state has defined and achieved the economic policy according to the interests of the
dominant groups. These interest groups have reciprocal relationship and their in-
terests coincide in many ways. The alliance among these groups is crucial in the pro-
cess of extracting the country's resources and in maximizing their respective pro-
fits.
This analysis is supported by conclusions of some commentators (Macgaffy,
1987) on Zaire, who consider the economic crisis in terms of unequal exchange in
which a political-administrative bourgeoisie assists the multinationals to transfer
wealth to industrialized countries, and hold the view that underdevelopment and
dependency are self-perpetuating. They see Zairean dependency as primarily









Targets or expectations from other partners.
a. Western Powers: political and military support; technology; financial aid
and loans.
b. Foreign trade & Investors: technology; financial means.
c. National bourgeoisie: legitimacy; ruling class of the state.
a. Western Powers: technology; political and military support to control the
state; financial means.
b. Foreign trade & Investors: technology; financial means; joint venture.
c. State: instrument of wealth accumulation through corruption, embezzle-
ment, high salaries and policy making.
a. Western Powers: to maintain pressure on the state in order to secure their
business and to obtain other advantages.
b. State: guarantee against nationalization; maximization of profits by main-
taining low salaries, low prices and compulsory cultivation of cash crops;
liscal exonerations, etc.
c. National bourgeoisie: joint venture to evade nationalization threat; supply
of inappropriate and costly technology.
a. State: regular source of cheap raw materials; market for manufactured
goods and technology; political vassal.
b. National bourgeoisie: political devotion; high profits through technology
transfer, debt repayment and cheap raw materials.
c. Foreign trade & Investors: eJ.1:ension of the market of national industries
and manpower; exploitation of minerals and other resources.
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technological. In this view, the state-based class controls the economic activity of
the country; foreign technical and military cooperation (and even intervention)
gives this class the means to maintain power. From this perspective, Callaghy
(1984:56) concludes that "the cause of Zairean failure is the project of self-
aggrandizement of the state-based class as it pursues its narrow personal and class
interests." However, there have been some clashes between these partners. For ex-
ample, the nationalization of UMHK was the result of conflict of interests between
the state (and the ruling bourgeoisie) and Belgium (and foreign investors). Also
Zaireanization and radicalization can be considered as an attempt of the national
bourgeoisie to replace the foreign trade.
The state exerts its exploitation of the peasant agriculture through compulsory
cultivation of cash-crops, taxes and links with the commercial bourgeoisie. State
officials are perceived by the peasant community as a coercive power acting against
local interests. This negative perception has been strengthened by the fact that state
officials do not belong to the local community. In this context, the state does not en-
courage peasant organizations, which are perceived as a threat or a challenge to its
power. The dominant social classes cannot allow the constitution of peasant
regional or village interest groups. Thus, attempts to promote agricultural
cooperatives and other local organizations are not supported by the dominant coali-
tion. Meanwhile, as Young & Turner (1985) argued, Zairean civil society is a
helpless spectator. It is asked to shoulder the cost of transactions between the state
and its external political partners and economic creditors. Consequently. the ex-
ploitation of the common people by the above described alliance has provoked the
current agrarian crisis.
CONCLUSION
The current economic crisis which hit Zaire since the middle of the 1970s is, first
of all, an agrarian crisis. This agrarian crisis explains the paradoxical situation of a
country potentially very rich but whose people are among the poorest in Africa.
The state's economic policy has strongly linked Zairean economy to the copper,
and has strengthened the dependency towards foreign investors and international
financial institutions. This economic policy resulted in a complete failure: Most of
the projects financed in the frame of this policy have been abandoned. This has
been the case for the Maluku steel mill, SMTF, Sodimiza, etc. Today the country is
even unable to repay regularly the interests of its foreign debt.
Though they previously aimed to achieve the economic sovereignty, the mining
investments have enriched only a thin minority to the prejudice of the majority of
Zairean population. The wealth accumulated through corruption. embezzlement
and exploitation of the common people is mostly kept abroad or ostentatiously con-
sumed; thus. lost to the Zairean economy. Young & Turner (1985) have estimated
that taking together the external debt and the corrupt drainage of public resources
in one form or another (probably 5 billion dollars over the decade) the Zairean
economy got a loss roughly equal to a quarter of the recorded gross national pro-
duct.
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Macgaffy (1987:49) noted that "the powerful ruling class benefited from the
crisis because decreased supply and acute scarcity resulted in rampant speculation,
which favored those who controlled strategic points in the distribution network.
Thus agricultural production is not encouraged because imports allow oppor-
tunities for huge profits." Gould (1979) also noted that viewing mismanagement as
a constraint on development misrepresents reality; it may be part of a conscious
self-enrichment strategy on the part of those in control of public bureaucracy.
In the current economic context, the common people do not participate actively
in the national economy and do not equitably share the national product. Thus, to
overcome underdevelopment in Zaire requires the definition and achievement of an
economic policy actually emphasizing agriculture, in particular the peasant
agriculture, which still continues to be the main component of national develop-
ment.
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